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The O.S. National Interest in the Middle Bast
In recent years American foreign policy makers, and the 
American public in general, have had to cope with rapidly 
occurring changes in the Middle Bast, which have had sweeping 
effects on the international political and economic order. As a 
result of events such as the formation and rise to power of OPEC: 
in the 1960's and '70's, the overthrow of the Shah of Ira in 
1979 and the subsequent American hostage ordeal, and the failed 
U.S. "peace keeping" mission in Lebanon which resulted in the 
deaths of over 200 U.S. marines in 1983, it has become 
increasingly clear that the United States is unable to control 
developments in the region, even in areas of traditional 
influence. While it may be that this decline in influence was 
inevitable, the thesis to be argued here is that many of the 
"unfavorable" changes in the Middle East were the product of an 
often Incoherent and misguided U.S. foreign policy toward the 
region.
Although the discussion to follow will briefly examine 
relevant past events, its primary purpose is to look ahead. In 
order to better understand U.S. objectives in the region, and to 
discover the methods by which these objectives can be more fully 
attained, this discussion will attempt to analyse three 
important topics. First, what U.S. national interests in the 
region are, as properly defined. Second, the current visible
i
2and hidden threats to U.S. national interests in the Middle 
Bast. And third, the methoJs which the United States can and 
should use to better adapt its policy to events in the Middle 
Bast of the present and future.
Before beginning to delve into the complexities of the 
discussion to follow, it seems that one basic point requires 
clarification, and that is the meaning of the term the Middle 
East. As it turns out, merely deciding which nations make up 
the Middle East is no easy task, and is a topic of some 
dispute. Therefore, I have chosen to delineate the region in a 
manner which best suits the issues to be discussed, namely the 
region's oil wealth, Islamic fundamental ism, Soviet involvement 
in the region, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, for the 
purposes of the discussion to follow the Middle Bast refers to 
the nations of Bgypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, The People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Libya, and the 
Sudan. 1 This geographical limitation !s in no way intended to 
suggest that events in other nations do not affect the region 
defined above, nor that this is the "correct" delineation of the 
Middle East in terms of the nations which are Included, or 
excluded from it. It is merely provided for the noble purposes 
of clarity and understanding, and wll} act as a helpful boundary 
for this discourse. Kith this in mind, our attention shifts to
3one of the primary activities in foreign policy circles) the 
determination of O.S. national Interests in the Middle East.
The phrase "to protect the national interest" has been used
repeatedly in the 20th Century to justify the actions of
American presidents and other world leaders. Although it may be
that the term "national interest" has become, a successful
legitimizing agent over time, it seems that the term's overuse
has left its meaning unclear, and has weakened its power as an
explanatory tool. The primary problem which arises from the
overuse and misuse of the term "national interest" is that the
relatively obvious differences among the numerous concerns of a
nation's foreign policy are clouded. There is a need to realize
that "certain interests must be defended at all costs; others
should be safeguarded under particular circumstances; and
certain others, although desirable, can almost never be 
2defended." This need is perhaps best satisfied through the 
establishment of an equivalent to Maslcw's "Hierarchy of Human 
Needs" adapted to the realm of foreign policy. Similar to the 
human need to first satisfy food and shelter requirements before 
concentrating on "higher" desires, there is a need for a 
nation's foreign policy to give primary attention to certain 
interests which are inexorably linked to that nation's future 
continued existence as a sovereign state. It is these 
interests, which must be protected at whatever cost, that can be 
justifisbly termed "national interests."
4While many authors have attempted to establish the
qualifying characteristics of a ’'national interest/ 1 the
definition set out by Hans Morgenthau seems to fit most adeptly
to the character of the discussion above. In his book, Politics
Among Nations, Morgenthau states that, "The national interest of
a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national
security, and national security must be defined as integrity of
3the national territory and of its institutions.” Although U.S. 
national interests in the Middle Bast may appear to be non­
existent given the fact that the United States in no way even 
comes close to bordering the region; in the interdependent world 
of the 1980's, it seems clear that the integrity of at least one 
of the United States' institutions is at stake there*
When one more closely examines Morgenthau's definition and 
applies it to U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Middle 
East, the most obvious U.S. national interest in the region 
seems to lie in the realm of economics. Clearly, one of the 
primary institutions of any nation-state is its economy, due to 
the fact that economic power can and often has been translated 
into military and/or national power which in turn can be used to 
defend the nation's territory and its other institutions. As a 
result, each nation has a strong desire to maintain the 
viability of its own economy, in the late 20th Century, 
however, the desire to maintain a strong national economy has 
been expanded to include an interest in the viability of the
5world economy. This is primarily true for the "Western" nations 
who are each Important participants in the capitalist system a 
system which depends on an active exchange of goods and services 
to maintain its strength. The interest in maintaining the 
economies of one's trading partners became most pronounced 
during the worldwide recessions of the early 1970's and 80's. 
During this period, declining world oil production and 
accompanying price hikes affected not only highly dependent 
Western Europe and Japan, but also produced indirect turmoil for 
other economies which were far less in need of foreign sources 
of oil. As a result of these experiences it became clear that 
the national economic interests of the United States could no 
longer be defined in a vacuum. Thus, when one asks the 
question: What are U.S. national economic interests in the
Middle East, one is referring to the common economic interests 
of the entire Western World, and any additional economic 
interests which may be solely of concern to the United States.
When one considers the fact that almost 601 of the world's 
proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East, and that 13% 
of the remaining total is located behind the "iron Curtain", the 
economic importance of the region to the United States and the
4West becomes readily apparent. Furthermore, while the level of 
U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil imports has fluctuated in 
recent years, it seems that over the long term the U.S.
"national interest" in maintaining secure and steady access to
i
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6the region’s oil resources will remain primary. This becomes 
particularly clear when one examines the general trends in U.5 . 
patterns of oil consumption during the 1970's and 80's, and the 
current market conditions for oil in the United States and the 
world.
The dangers associated with dependence on insecure sources 
of oil became evident in the early 1970's when, in response to 
renewed Arab-lsraeli fighting, OPEC declared that it would 
unilaterally quadruple the price of its crude oil. In fact, 
following the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-lsraeli War, the 
price of crude oil rose from $3 per barrel in September to 
almost $12 per barrel by December; the result of an Arab oil 
embargo which led to a net decline in world oil production of
54.4 million barrels per day. The economic conditions at the 
time of the Arab oil embargo also gave the "oil weapon" a little 
extra force. Rapidly growing demand coupled with a decrease in 
the supply of oil put the Western market economies in a weak 
bargaining position concerning the price increases. While the 
oil shock was at the outset most severe in Western Europe and 
Japan, the economic effects of the price increases were soon 
global in nature.
In response to this first energy crisis, a conference was 
convened in Washington in February 1974 to unite the Western 
alliance behind a policy of countering the newly discovered 
power of the oil producers. Prior to the conference, Western
Europe aliC Japan had been pursuing independent courses of action
directed toward the striking of bilateral deals which would
alleviate the pressures associated with having an uncertain oil
supply. Their independent courses proved to be unsuccessful,
however, as a wild scramble for oil on the world market ensued
and consumer insecurity reached frantic heights. In response to
the inability of the individual Western nations to effectively
deal with an increasingly unstable environment, the Western
alliance agreed at the W*»Mngtpn conference to form an
International Energy Agency (IBA), and a standby emergency oil
sharing program. These moves helped to placate the acute
concerns of Western Europe and Japan, as did the long-term
commitment of the ISA's member nations to ber,in efforts at
conservation,’^ stockpiling* a«id research and development of
6alternative sources of energy. In the period from 1973 to *78, 
the Western Europeans and Japanese utilised conservation and 
pricing policies to help decrease their extreme energy 
vulnerabilities. These policies, in conjunction with slower 
economic growth, led to a 2.3 percent decline in their total oil
7
requirements over the period.
In the United States, the public remained highly skeptical 
about the genuineness of the supposed oil scarcity. And, 
contrary to the trend in Western Europe and Japan, U.S. imports 
out of the world oil market increased by 28.5 percent over the 
same period of 1973-78. The failure of the United States to
7
8undertake effective conservation policies and to Increase 
utilization of its own indigenous supply of oil not only 
increased U.S. dependence on foreign sources of oil, but also 
heightened resentment in the rest of the Western world. These 
nations undoubtedly viewed U.S. competition for a larger share 
of the international oil supply as a threat to their already 
limited ability to withstand any future supply shocks. 
Unfortunately, in late 1978, the concerns of Western Europe and 
Japan proved to be well warranted.
By the end of 1977 U.S. oil import dependence had reached a 
new peak with foreign oil providing fox 48 percent of
9consumption. World oil supplies were only barely adequate, 
creating a situation in which even a minor decrease in the 
supply of oil would bring with it a pronounced change in price. 
The catalyst for just such a change soon appeared as the 
revolutionary overthrow of the Shah of Iran paved the way for a 
second major world oil crisis. A component of the successful 
plan to overthrow the Shah was the halting of all exports of 
Iranian oil by oil workers sympathetic to the cause, leaving 
behind a 5.4 million barrels a day gap between world oil demand 
and supply. * 0 This gap proved to be more than enough to create 
a frenzy in the world oil market and to send prices 
skyrocketing. Because of efforts by other OPEC members 
(primarily Saudi Arabia) the initial loss of Iranian oil exports 
was soon partially offset by increases jn production elsewhere,
9and by a gradual return to production in Iran itself. By the 
middle of 1980 the market appeared as though it had stabilised 
somewhat.
This brief "stable" period was soon destroyed by a second 
drop in total OPEC oil production which accompanied the outbreak 
of the Iran-Iraq War in September of 1980. The result was a 10 
percent decline in world oil exports and a hike in the market 
price to a new $41 a barrel ceiling by December of 1980. The 
shocks produced by this second oil crisis caused drastic changes 
in the world oil market. The demand for oil fell as the world 
economy headed for a serious recession, and as inflation began 
to take command over the Western world. The incentives for 
increased production of indigenous oil were now strong enough to 
encourage a rise in the non-OPEC share of the market. 
Furthermore, conservation efforts in the United States were 
taken up with a great deal more seriousness as a result of 
government incentive programs and regulation. As a result of 
changes such as these, world demand for oil fell from almost 51 
million barrels of oil per day in 1979 to less than 44 million 
barrels of oil per day by 1983.**
Although the decline in demand for world oil and the 
accompanying price cuts have contributed greatly to the 
rejuvenation of the economies of the Western alliance, many 
analysts are currently advising that the string of recent oil 
shocks is far from over. In fact, current conditions may be the 
precursor of an untold disaster which lies ahead. Most
10
recently# a study conducted by the National Petroleum Council at
the request of Energy Secretary John S. Harrington found that,
"...by 1995 as much as 60 percent of the nation's oil needs
would have to be supplied from foreign sources, up from 27
percent in 1985." The study also contends that by the early
1990's the members of OPEC will, "...probably be exerting
greater control over the world oil market than they did in the 
131970's." The chief concern currently is over declining
domestic production in the United States, which fell by about 9
percent between February and December of 1986, and is estimated
to fall by an additional 300,000 to 500,000 barrels per day 
14during 1987. This decline is not only producing short-term 
trouble for Texas, but it is also likely to be a long-term 
threat to U.S. national security. This becomes particularly 
evident when one examines the realities of domestic oil 
production under current market conditions. Unprofitable wells 
are being "capped" in order to halt production. Since the costs 
of redrilling a marginal well are extremely high, the oil left 
behind will undoubtedly remain in the ground until prices rise 
to currently unimaginable levels. Furthermore, the redrilling 
of these marginal, yet vitally important, wells takes time, time 
which may be extremely costly to U.S. national security during 
an oil crisis of the proportions envisioned by the National 
Petroleum Council.
Although much of the attention of these analysts seems to
11
focus on the potential resurgence of OPEC in the 1990's, the 
preceding overview of recent world oil market history suggests 
that the exercise of OPEC's potential power has required a 
catalyst exterior to itself. In 1973, the catalyst was a 
renewed Arab-Israeli conflict; and, in 1979-80, the catalysts 
were the revolutionary overthrow of the pro-.Western Shah of Iran 
and the outbreak of a destructive war between Iran and Iraq.
All of which suggests that the protection of the U.S. national 
interest in the Middle Bast will require careful consideration 
of threats more volatile and numerous than the future plans of 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Up to this point, this discussion of U.S. national interests 
in the Middle East has centered on only one national interest, 
the need to maintain a steady supply of oil coming from the 
Middle East headed for the Western World. The reason for this 
is that after careful consideration, this concern is the only 
one of several traditional concerns of U.S. foreign policy 
makers which closely fits into the framework of the "national 
interest", as properly defined previously. For reasons to be 
taken up shortly, the remaining traditional concerns: the
security of Israel, the threat of Soviet expansion into the 
region, and the Arab-lsraell conflict, are at the most quasi- 
national interests and, at the least, non-interests. So, as to 
further clarify the distinction which is intended, it seems 
helpful to categorize all of the feasible components of U.S
12
foreign policy toward the Middle East under three headings. The 
first category is composed of the "hub concerns." These 
concerns fulfill Morgenthau's criteria of a national interest by 
being vital to the integrity of a nation's territory, or of its 
most important institutions. The second category is made up of 
what will be referred to as "spoke concerns.” These concerns 
are the result of world conditions, and are related to all 
potentially realistic threats to the hub concerns. The 
individual spoke concerns may change over time; however, only as 
quickly as all opportunities for a successful attack on the hub 
are eliminated. The third and final category contains the 
instruments or methods which carl be used to protect the hub, 
otherwise known as the national interest. These so-called 
"instrument concerns" may include nations which can aid in the 
protection of an ally's national interest, or they may be 
components of a nation's armed forces, etc. This final category 
is the most apt to change in character over time or from 
situation to situation.
While the preceding discussion has sought to establish the 
extremely vital nature of the U.S. national interest in 
maintaining a steady flow of oil to the Western industrial 
economies, the remainder of this discourse paper on the three 
spoke concerns of the United States in the Middle last of the 
1980's. They ace a desire to limit the threat posed to 
stability in the region by Islamic fundamentalism; a need to
13
contain Soviet activity in the Middle Bast; and a drive to 
squelch the inflammatory nature of the Arab-lsraeli conflict.
All of which pose long-term challenges for a foreign policy 
whose primary purpose is the protection of Western access to the 
region's oil. The final portion of this study will center on 
the threat posed by an improperly conceived American foreign 
policy toward the Middle East.
Islamic Fundamentalism
Since the early 1970's up to the present, a great deal of 
public attention has been focused on three recurring events in 
the Middle Bast: hostage taking, internal violence directed at
a reigning leader, and the numerous acts of "terrorism." Many 
recent disturbances of these types can be linked to the rise to 
power of Islamic fundamentalists in Iran, which has acted as a 
spark for fiery events throughout the region. Although 
fundamentalism has not, as of yet, turned into a blazing inferno 
throughout the region, there have been periodic flareups in 
several nations which are vital to the U.S. national interest in 
the region. Furthermore, in several nations of the Middle East 
conditions may be favorable for an effective fundamentalist 
campaign sometime in the near future. While any attempt to 
predict the future is purely speculative, a good foreign policy 
geared toward the effective protection of vital national 
interests must create contingency plans based on all feasible 
occurrences. As a result, this section will attempt to examine 
the patterns of recent Islamic disturbances, which signals a 
need to re-examine U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle Bast.
In order to better understand the conditions under which the 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism may be a danger to Western 
access to a secure and steady supply of oil, a brief examination 
of certain features of Islam seems to be required. As pointed
■ * t
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out by Daniel Pipes, the need to understand Islam has increased 
given its social and political importance in the Middle East of 
the 1980's.
Proposals for solving the Arab-Israel conflict must consider 
the special Islamic concern for the control of territory. 
American or Soviet negotiators seeking military bases must 
take into account vehement Islamic sensibilities against the 
presence of non-Muslim troops••.Even business interests need 
to watch Islam, for many key oil exporting states entertain 
powerful sentiments of grievance and resentment against the 
Christian West.
Islam, like many of the world*s other religions, has been
prone to the effects of divisiveness, which have limited its
ability to act as a powerful, unified force throughout the
region. While there are many small divisions within the Islamic
faith, the primary split is that between the Sunni and the Shi*a
Muslims. The much larger group of Sunni Muslims do not provide
for any formal process of reinterpretation of the Sharia, which
is Muslim law as derived from the Qur'an. Consequently, the
Sunnis have had no need for religious leaders to act as
interpreters of the faith; and as a result of this lack of an
institutionalized religious hierarchy, the Sunnis have been
unlikely to mobilize toward change. The Shi'a Muslims, on the
other hand, do have a system of religious interpretation called
ijtihad through which reinterpretations of the Sharia are handed
down by a religious scholar on an issue of concern to the 
2people. The most influential of these scholars are the 
ayatollahs and the grand ayatollahs, the most prominent of which
16
is the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. Given the Shi'ite belief
that the grand ayatollahs are, "literally the manifestation of
God on earth", it is not hard to understand how the masses in
Iran were eventually mobilized away from modernization and back 
3to Islam. The distinction made between the Shi'a and Sunni 
Muslims is not intended to suggest that either group is less 
serious about obedience to their faith as they see it. However, 
it does seem to suggest that prior to the successful Iranian 
revolution active dissent was more likely to come from the more 
hierarchically organized Shi'ite groups than from the more 
individualistic, "traditional" Sunnis. Currently, however, for 
reasons to be examined later, the Sunnis may be just as prone to 
dissent, especially in those Middle Eastern nations hardest hit 
by a recent decline in national income.
One lesson that should have been learned as a result of the 
revolution in Iran is that modernization, or interaction with 
the West, is not likely to gain the favor of the public, nor the 
religious sector in the Middle East, unless the change is 
gradual, controlled, and widely beneficial. The changes in Iran 
clearly did not obey these instructions, especially during the 
latter years of the Shah's rule. William Forbis points to 
several factors which contributed to the fall of the Shah of 
Iran. First, rapidly rising oil income was used to fuel rapid 
industrialization which brought with it inflation, rising 
expectations, and a.move by thousands of agricultural laborers
17
to the cities. Second, the Shah of Iran alienated the
merchants, not only by arresting them for "profiteering", but
also by allowing the establishment of Western style banks which
eliminated the demand for the bazaari's traditional moneylending
business. And third, the Shah proved to be unable to satisfy
the tide of rising expectations, as agricultural production
declined while appetites rose, and as the population in the
highly concentrated cities grew while the supply of jobs
4remained constant. It was in the context of disturbing social 
changes such as these that the fundamentalist revolution under 
the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini took hold.
The change from a "secular" government to an Islamic one was
viewed with hope by many observers within Iran, as well as
outside of it. For those inside of Iran who had been alienated
by the changes v’hich had accompanied modernization, and angered
by the disparate wealth of the government's leaders, the return
to Islamic values provided a "renewed sense of confidence and 
5direction." Furthermore, since the basis of this change was 
religious, it was widely supported, despite the fact that the 
return to Islamic doctrine brought with it disturbing social 
changes whose reach was in some instances even more pervasive 
than those which accompanied modernization. One of the big 
attractions of the fundamentalist Shi'a doctrine is the call for 
redistribution of wealth on more equitable terms. The promises 
of the Islamic leadership in revolutionary Iran, that a return
18
to traditional values will bring with it greater economic 
equality, has continued to fuel dissent by the traditionally 
impoverished minority Shi'ites, and by many impoverished and/or 
extremist Sunnis throughout the region. It may be that the 
ability of the Islamic leader in Iran to find a sympathetic 
audience is exactly what makes revolutionary Iran a major threat 
to stability and to the U.S. national interest in the Middle 
East. This is especially true if the promise of redistribution 
of the region's wealth can be used to mobilize the masses for 
less than noble purposes.
The first of many incidents which occurred in the wake of
the Iranian revolution and suggested the potentially destructive
power of the fundamentalist movement was the November 1979
takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Sunni extremists. The
takeover was shocking, not only because it was propagated by
Sunni Muslims who are historically obedient to the established
order, but also because it occurred inside of Saudi Arabia.**
While Saudi troops fought to regain control of the holiest
shrine of Islam, riots broke out in the eastern section of the
country led by Shi'ite fundamentalists who chose to defy the
Saudi government's ban on the self-flaggelation demonstrations
7associated with the Shi'a holy festival of Ashura. Although 
these uprisings were indeed embarrassing moments for the 
government of Saudi Arabia, it does not seem that the government 
was ever in danger of being overthrown by the minority of Saudi
19
Arabian Shi'ite and Sunni fundamentalists and/or radicals who 
took part in them. However, this does not mean that the Saudi 
government has no reason to be genuinely concerned about the 
future activities of the fundamentalists in their nation and in 
the region.
A great deal of the Saudi government's concern about the 
fundamentalists is the result of an ideological rift that exists 
between the Shi'ite ruled theocracy in Iran and the Sunni ruled 
monarchy in Saudi Arabia. The crucial difference of opinion is 
over the issue of whether the leader of an Islamic nation who is 
not a member of the clergy can be considered legitimate.
Because the Shi'ite ruled Iran considers the religious 
leadership to be the only legitimate rulers, it is not 
surprising that the Saudi family, which retains control over 
political, military and bureaucratic power, has come under 
heated Iranian verbal attack. The Saudi ruling family has also 
come under attack for its support of Iraq in the war, and fcr 
its increasingly visible acceptance of peaceful relations with 
the United States, the "Great Satan."
Iranian government "revolutionary" activities in the region 
have not been limited to mere words either. In fact, it appears 
that Ayatollah Montazeri, the most likely successor to the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, has been a strong advocate of a drive to 
export the Iranian revolution, and has "succeeded in channeling 
money, weapons and other support for various Islamic
20
movements." This effort has continued despite shrunken oil
revenue and the severe economic drain of the Iran-Iraq War,
signalling the importance of a desire to export the revolution's
principles for Iran's religious leadership. The results of the
efforts to export the revolution have been both tangible and
psychological in nature. On the tangible side, there was the
coup attempt directed at the government of Bahrain, carried out
by a group of Shi'a Muslims in December of 1981. Those
apprehended following the thwarted coup attempt were alleged to
be members of the Teheran based Islamic Front for the Liberation 
gof Bahrain. A great deal of evidence was discovered that 
implied Iranian involvement, prompting one author to conclude 
that, "For Iran, despite all the rhetoric about exporting the 
revolution, no move had ever before been as bold or as obvious 
as the coup attempt."1’0 In other instances, Iranian involvement 
in Shi'a Muslim attacks or uprisings seems to be less direct, 
and yet important. For example, the bombings of the U.S. marine 
compound and the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983-84 were 
apparently conducted by members of the fundamentalist Islamic 
Jihad. Although direct involvement by Iran in the planning of 
these attacks is doubtful, there does seem to be sketchy 
evidence that some of the members of this group had acquired 
their terrorist "skills" in Iranian sponsored training camps.1’1' 
Psychologically speaking, the fear of attack or uprising has 
been implanted in the minds of the leaders of the region and in
0
i
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the minds of the leaders of nations which might choose to become
involved in the region, and has produced certain changes desired
by the fundamentalists and the leaders in Iran, In Saudi
Arabia, following the violence of 1979, the government began to
more strictly enforce the Islamic code of law in order to dispel
criticism from the fundamentalists. In 1981, in response to
concern about the Iran-Iraq war and the inflammatory potential
of the Iranian revolution in their countries, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates joined
12together to form the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). And, in 
February of 1984, the Narines were withdrawn from Lebanon and 
"redeployed" to ships offshore.
To the extent that Islamic fundamentalism has produced 
attitude changes within the nations of the Middle East, the U.S. 
position in the region in terms of influence over events has 
declined* For the United States, the "loss" of Iran was tragic, 
not only because Iran had been an instrument which could be 
mobilized to protect the U.S. national interest, but also 
because the fall of the Shah of Iran called into question the 
prestige of the U.S. as an ally. Some of the mistakes which led 
to this "loss" will be discussed later; however, for now let it 
suffice to say that revolutionary Iran's promotion of an anti- 
Western ideology is proceeding at great cost to the United 
States. These costs have manifested themselves in terms of loss 
of human life, instability in friendly Arab nations, and in an
22
increasingly standoffish attitude in the region toward the U.S., 
often reaching the level of outright hatred. All of these costs 
are signs of a larger instability which may soon gravely 
threaten the U.S. national interest in the Middle East, which is 
Western access to the region's oil supply.
This larger threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the Western
economic system, through the endangerment of secure access to
oil, may manifest itself in four ways. The first potential
danger rests in the possibility of indigenous fundamentalists
staging destructive attacks on the oil production facilities in
their country with the intent of undermining the power of their
nation's leaders. This type of attack, although unsuccessful,
was attempted in Kuwait in December of 1983. Along with five
other bombings perpetrated on the same day, including one at the
American embassy in Kuwait, a bombing was attempted at the
Shuaiba Petrochemical Plant. Fortunately, only a small
proportion of the explosives wired to go off actually did, and a
13major catastrophe was averted. A successful attack of this 
type on an oil production or storage center would leave the 
government with a fire which might burn for months and even 
years, while acting as a symbol of the leader's weakness or 
inability to maintain the loyalty of his people. Undoubtedly, 
it would also lead to a decline in oil production, and might 
also contribute to greater regional instability.
The second way. in which Islamic fundamentalism might
23
jeopardize Western Access to Middle Eastern oil involves direct 
attacks on leaders, who are viewed as religiously impure, 
corrupt, "pro-U.S.", or "moderate”, by indigenous groups. These 
attacks may include massive protest or revolt as in Iran, coup 
attempts as in Bahrain in 1981, or outright assassination as in 
the case of Egypt's Anwar Sadat in 1981. Such attacks can be 
extremely destabilizing, leading to radical and uncontrollable 
changes which may very quickly transform a nation or the entire 
region.
A third way in which Islamic fundamentalists may undermine 
the security of the U.S. national interest in the Middle East is 
by exporting the revolutionary ideas and changes which have 
developed in their own nations to other nations in the region. 
The agents of this exportation of ideas may be workers who move 
across national lines to find work, Muslim pilgrims making the 
trek to Mecca, or individuals who travel to other nations in the 
Middle East as students or tourists. Current economic 
conditions may also cause many who would not have been attentive 
to these agents if the oil boom had continued to become 
receptive to Islamic fundamentalist doctrine, making this method 
of subtle subversion that much more effective. The Iranian 
government has also developed a direct method aimed at exporting 
its revolutionary ideas, involving the beaming of extensive 
radio and television programming throughout the Gulf. The 
programming schedule includes Islamic fundamentalist messages,
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attacks on the ruling monarchies, and news about the
14"successful” war effort against Iraq.
The final way in which Islamic fundamentalists may threaten 
secure access by the West to the region*s oil supply i3 by 
waging a '*war of terrorism” against other nations in the region 
and their leaders. This could remain at the level of mere 
sponsorship of individuals who are prepared to carry out the 
will of Allah as handed down by the religious leaders; it could 
entail direct attacks on the oil production facilities or oil 
supertankers of another nation; or it could develop into an all- 
out military confrontation.
Just how threatening each of these methods is to regional
stability and to the U.S. national interest relative to the
others is unclear* However, it should be clear by now that
Islamic fundamentalism does have a large potential power, as a
result of the existence of a fairly substantial receptive
audience throughout the region. This is particularly true in
the nations with large Shi'ite Muslim populations in terms of
percent of the total population, such as Bahrain - 70 percent,
15North Yemen - 50 percent, and Kuwait - 24 percent. Islamic 
fundamentalist doctrine is also finding a receptive audience 
among the Sunnis in countries whose leaders are politically 
unpopular or in nations with currently poor economic conditions, 
as in the cases of Egypt and North Yemen. Here, the appeal of 
the portion of the doctrine which calls for greater economic
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equality and a return to traditional values and customs is 
particularly strong.
The most unpleasant prospect that could be envisioned for 
the Middle Bast in the near future would be the emergence of a 
victorious Revolutionary Iran from the lengthy Iran-Iraq War, 
gearing up to take on its other major enemy in the Gulf, Saudi 
Arabia. Although Iran denies having any territorial designs on 
Saudi Arabia, it is clear from the Iranian government's rhetoric 
that the religious leadership would like nothing better than to 
affect a change in the leadership of Saudi Arabia, possibly 
through the use of violent means. And, since it appears that no 
feasible amount of military build-up would put Saudi Arabia on 
an equal footing with Iran or Iraq, its only real option is to
"use its early warning system and interceptor aircraft to delay
16an enemy attack until help arrives from the outside*” The 
threat of attack is far greater still where the smaller, 
sparsely populated countries of Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are concerned* All of them are 
important oil producers in their own right, and all border the 
nation which commands the world's primary remaining oil 
reservoir, Saudi Arabia* Stability in these nations is thus 
extremely important, as is the security of Saudi Arabia's 
northern border with Iraq and its southern border with North and 
South Yemen* As stressed earlier, if dependence on Middle 
Eastern oil increases worldwide, as it is expected to, any
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fundamental cutback in supply, whether the result of the effects 
of a war or a limited attack on oil production facilities, could 
bring with it another worldwide recession and could throw the 
Western market economy into a state of utter chaos.
In order for the United States to have a foreign policy 
which, at the least, does not exacerbate the Islamic 
fundamentalist problem in the Middle East, it should try to 
follow three "rules of thumb." First, U.S. foreign policy 
should concentrate on being sensitive to the actual and 
potential threat which fundamentalist doctrine and revolutionary 
Iran present to regional stability and the U.S. national 
interest in the region. Second, this sensitivity, and the 
knowledge gained from it, should be applied in the analysis of 
the foreign policies of nations in the area. Such application 
will undoubtedly yield more nearly correct answers to such 
questions as why countries such as Egypt, Kuwait, Oman or Saudi 
Arabia are wary of certain kinds of interaction with the United 
States at this point in time. And third, U.S. foreign policy 
should be geared toward rectifying the errors of the past which, 
although not the sole cause of instability in the region, have 
greatly heightened the degree of animosity toward the United 
States in the Middle East.
With the U.S. national interest and the "spoke" concern of 
Islamic fundamentalism firmly in mind, our attention shifts once 
again to a second "spoke" concern (or realistic threat to the
27
"hub")# which is the destabilizing nature of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and of the U.S. stance with regard to that conflict# 
Both of which have greatly contributed to the general inability
of the United States to eliminate the threats to its national 
interest presented by Islamic fundamentalism, Soviet involvement 
in the region, and the Arab-Israeli conflict itself.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Because the Arab-Israeli conflict has demonstrated its 
potential for undermining regional and global stability, as well 
as the security of the West's access to Arab oil, there have 
been some repeated efforts undertaken in the hope of resolving 
it# These efforts have been largely unsuccessful, however, as a 
result of; the uncompromising positions taken by each side on one 
point or another and the general animosity which has developed 
between the parties to the conflict over the years# Although 
the costs which have accrued to the United States as a result of 
the continuation of this conflict are not as direct as those 
imposed on Israel and the Arab world, these costs are 
substantial enough to warrant intense effort on the part of the 
U#S. to peacefully secure a stable, equitable settlement#
Sadly, however, it seems that because of the so-called "special 
relationship" between the United States and Israel, the U#S#' 
credibility as a potential mediator of the conflict has come 
under increasing attack# Furthermore, the costs of maintaining 
this "special relationship" in its present form in a hostile 
environment have continued to accrue on the U#S# side of the 
ledger. It is these costs, which present a growing threat to 
the U#S• national interest in the Middle East, that form the 
framework of this portion of our discussion#
While this entire treatise adopts a relatively restricted
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view of the U.S. national interest in the Middle East, the much 
broader view taken by many government officials and analysts 
concludes that one of the several "U.S. national interests” in 
the region is the security of Israel, Although it may be that, 
as former President Richard Nixon stated in 1981, "With regard 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, one premise from which United 
States policy must proceed is our strong moral commitment to the 
preservation of the state of Israel,”1 It is not so clear that 
this legitimate concern for the security of Israel should be 
allowed to pre-empt the national interest of the U,S. set out in 
the preceding pages. To a considerable extent, however, whether 
by unconscious error or by conscious policy formulation, this is 
exactly what has occurred to the long-term detriment of the true 
U*S. national interest.
The title of "spoke” concern seems to fit well with the U,S, 
desire to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, given the costs 
associated with continuing the conflict in a manner such that 
regional stability, U.S. credibility, and consequently, the U.S. 
national interest are perpetually at risk. These costs became 
increasingly pronounced in the period following the June 1967 
Arab-Israeli War, during which American foreign policy toward 
the Middle East became more heavily founded on the premise that 
the United States had a primary interest in maintaining the 
"security" of Israel, In the wake of the Israeli victory in the 
'67 War, American relations with even the most moderate Arab
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nations deteriorated under a tide of anti-American sentiment
that developed from a basically correct perception in the Arab
world that the U.S. was quickly becoming pro-Israel, rather than
2choosing to remain an objective observer of the conflict. 
Furthermore, as the United States put greater emphasis on its 
"special relationship" with Israel, "Soviet influence in the 
Middle East increased vastly, as Moscow moved to rebuild the
militaries of Syria and Egypt, to support the PLO, and to
3befriend the Arabs in the wake of their defeat"; this topic 
will be taken up in greater depth in the section to follow the 
present one.
Possibly as a result of a preoccupation with the Vietnam War 
effort, the negative repercussions of the swing toward a pro- 
Israel position received little attention, while the U.S. 
relationship with Israel continued to grow stronger. In fact, 
in 1971, as highly visible evidence of this policy change, 
American aid to Israel was increased by 5 times the largest 
amount given previously, for a total of $600.8 million.* The 
justification for this sizable increase was found in an 
application of the Nixon Doctrine, which stated that the United 
States would provide military and economic assistance to those 
nations whose freedom had come under attack so that they could
5provide for their own defense. The assumption- underlying this 
doctrine was that if given the proper amount of military and 
economic assistance, countries such as Israel and Iran would
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have sufficient strength to deter aggression against themselves, 
while acting as a surrogate of the United States to maintain 
regional stability and to protect Western access to the region's 
oil supply.
The Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel in October of 
1973, and the Arab oil embargo which soon followed were enough 
to bring the Nixon doctrine under question. The 1973 Arab-* 
Israeli war quickly renewed U.S. attention to the Middle East.
It also led to a realization that U.S. support for Israel and 
the perception of a strong Israeli military were not sufficient 
to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor to insure regional 
stability.* Rather, a long-term, diplomatic solution was 
required to create a more peaceful environment. A second 
realization grew out of the imposition of the Arab oil embargo 
which caused economic dislocations in the U.S., Western Europe, 
and Japan. According to one recent study, the oil shock, 
whether real or merely psychological, pushed the U.S. economy 
into a recession, led to a 2 percent rise in the unemployment 
rate, a 3 percent rise in the inflation rate, and caused a 3.5
7
percent drop in the value of goods and services produced.
These effects of the October War, while not enough to bring 
about a radical change in the U.S. attitude regarding its 
"special relationship" with Israel, did bring U.S. foreign 
policy makers to the conclusion that the costs of leaving the 
Aral-Israeli conflict unresolved were extremely high, and posed
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grave dangers to the U.S. national interest. And consequently,
more effort would need to be devoted to the search for a long
lasting peace. Such an attitude was espoused in a 1975
Brookings Institution report entitled Toward Peace in the Middle
East. The report states that, "The United States, by its
intensive participation in negotiations since the 1973
war,••.has demonstrated that it recognizes its own vital
interest in an early end to conflict and enduring peace."
Subsequently, the report cites five broadly defined interests of
the United States which are at stake in the region: a desire to
limit the danger associated with future wars which may
completely uproot regional and global peace, a desire to
maintain friendly relations with Israel and the Arab world, a
"strong interest in the unimpeded flow of Middle Eastern
oil...", an interest in open trade relations with the entire
region, and an interest in the promotion of greater political
0
and economic stability.
The attitudes conveyed by the Brookings report soon became 
the policy of the Carter administration, as two of the reports' 
contributing authors, Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Quandt, 
went on to become members of President Carter's staff.
President Carter approached the enduring conflict in the Middle 
Bast with personal zeal, stressing the need to consider not only 
a traditional commitment to the security of Israel, but also an 
urgent need to "resolve the underlying problems, rather than see
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continued violence which threatened to spread beyond the Middle
9East and even to involve the superpowers•" It was clear from
the outset, however, that President Carter's, or any future
president's, ability to pursue a mediator role in the Middle
East would be greatly constrained by domestic political factors
and the actions or policies of his predecessors? and,
unfortunately, so would his ability to successfully protect the
United States' true national interest. As pointed out by
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,
Because of the intimate American association with Israel in 
previous Middle East peace efforts, for Carter to adopt an 
activist balanced policy carried a significant political 
risk. He could be seen both at he and in Israel as 
tilting toward the Arabs and pressu ng Israel to make 
dangerous territorial concessions."'
The primary domestic political factor with which an American 
president must deal is the so-called Israel lobby, whose 
operating arms include the American-Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC), the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti- 
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Although the power of the 
Israel lobby varies from issue to issue, it is clear that not 
only are the resources available to these agencies immense, but 
also that its ability to influence the lawmaking process is
unequalled, given the "solid, consistent and usually unified
1 1support of the Jewish communities of the United States."
These communities are usually ready, willing and able to donate 
funds to the election campaigns of candidates who maintain a pro-
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Israel stance, and to make phone calls or write letters to those 
Congressmen who have seemingly strayed off course.
Although most, if not all, of the activities of the Israel
lobby are entirely legitimate under a democratic political
system, the power of the lobby, arid the lack of opponents
possessing comparable resources, may result in a lack of
discussion of other very feasible alternatives, regarding any
particular issue in the Middle East. Thus, as stated by Senator
Charles Mathias, when evaluating the desirability of having an
overpowering Israel lobby, "a distinction must be drawn between
ethnicity, which enriches American life and culture, and
organized ethnic interest groups, which sometimes press causes
12that derogate from the national interest.1'
Whether or not one accepts the notion, that to the most 
effective lobbyist should go the "spoils", one must admit that 
it is risky for elected government officials to ignore the 
wishes of the Israel lobby for very long. The ri&k is 
particularly high for those who represent a district with a 
substantial Jewish constituency, and for those who serve on 
important congressional committees, such as House Foreign 
Affairs or the House Appropriation's Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee* The political dangers associated with not 
maintaining a pro-Israel stance are the result of two factors. 
The first factor is the careful channeling of substantial pro- 
Israel PAC contributions to the opponents of those elected
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officials who have "strayed" during their term in office, or to
pro-Israel incumbents who face electoral challenges.
Considering the amount of these contributions, which during the
1981-82 congressional election period totalled $1,873,623 and
represented the largest total PAC contribution in the U.S., it
is not outrageous to suggest that this lobby is able to directly
influence the character of U.S. policy toward the Middle East 
13and Israel. ' The second factor is the high turnout of American
Jews on election day, concentrated in the eight largest states.
For example, in New York where Jews make up only 15 percent of
the state's population, they constitute about 25 percent of the
14actual voters in any given election. Because these big states
are so important to presidential candidates, the interests of
the Jewish community must be given preferential attention.
Other analysts argue that the influence of the Israel lobby
on the American political process is even more pervasive. For
example, Cheryl Rubenberg argues that the lobby has actually
shaped public opinion and the political system over many years,
and has created a favorable environment in which withdrawing
support from Israel in any quantity is unthinkable.
Consequently, "regardless of how severely American interests in
the Middle East are compromised, the U.S. government will
15continue to provide Israel with complete support." This 
conclusion is reinforced by Senator Mathias, who suggests that, 
even if the pro-Israel policy was not entirely the product of
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the Israel lobby, it is clear that, Mbut for the efforts of
American Jews, our military and economic aid to Israel would've
16been less than it is."
Although a strong source of current trends in U.S. foreign 
policy toward the Middle East seems to be the Israel lobby, it 
is the American government and its officials which must bear the 
responsibility for the ramifications of adopting a strong pro- 
Israel stance* The extent of these ramifications becomes 
painfully clear when one considers the conclusion of Alan R* 
Taylor that,
Much of the Arab World’s alienation from the United States 
stems directly from its predictably negative response to 
American favoritism for Israel. **.in categorizing Israel 
as a "special interest", the United States has helped to 
polarize the Arab world and to incite radicalism* Moreover, 
it has placed the moderate Arab states in a predicament, 
forcing them to diversify their foreign policies.1'
Such favoritism for Israel has not only weakened the American
position in the Arab world, but it has also made settling the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem much more
difficult* This is because such favoritism simultaneously
weakened the potential influence of the U*S*, acting in the role
of a mediator, while adding to Israel's confidence and
eliminating the need for Israel to seek a negotiated peace with
its remaining adversaries*
The longer the United States continues to pursue a Middle 
Eastern policy which is unbalanced, and which fails to resolve 
the underlying Palestinian problem, the more likely it is that
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the conflict will get completely out of hand. Clearly, the Camp 
David Accords of the late 1970's have not ended Arab-Israeli 
fighting, as was demonstrated by the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, directed at PLO and Syrian forces in that country. 
Furthermore, although the accords did eliminate Egypt as an 
active participant in the conflict, there are signs in Egypt 
that this beneficial change may be short-lived, unless further 
steps are taken to bring both the Arab world and Israel to the 
negotiating table in the near future.
One of the reasons for Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem,
in the name of peace, was his own feeling that the United States
held all of the cards that his country needed for economic
growth and development. He undoubtedly realized that his
participation in a bilateral peace process would alienate Egypt
from the rest of the Arab world. However, Sadat also believed
that the loss of Arab support would be far outweighed by the
benefits of ties with the United States and the West. Seven
years later, despite extensive American aid, the economic
development which Sadat had hoped for has not materialized.
Host Egyptians are poorer now than in 1979. The country which
was a food exporter only 10 years ago must now import half of
its food at a cost of $10 million a day. Tacked on to this
economic drain are the subsidization programs used to hold down
the prices for bread and other staple foods at a cost of $7
19billion a year*
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As has occurred elsewhere in the Middle East, the economic
and social problems, which have continued to grow under the
leadership of President Hosni Mubarak, have fueled a resurgence
of Islamic fervor. Although the number of religious activists
is small, their calls for a return to Islamic principles, for a
rejection of reliance on foreign powers, and. for a recommitment
by Egypt to militant struggle against Israel, have an attentive
20audience numbering in the millions. Although the likelihood 
of an Iranian-type revolution occurring in Sunni Egypt is very 
slim, it is possible that the increasing pressure from the 
fundamentalists will affect the nature of Egypt's national 
policies. Possibly, this will result in a mere distancing by 
Egypt from open, blatant relations with the United States, or it 
may lead to a power change and a return, by Egypt, to the ranks 
of the Arab world.
It should be made clear that if there is an issue around 
which the Arab and non-Arab Islamic world can be united, it is 
the Palestinian issue. At the same time, because of historical, 
cultural, and domestic political factors that have combined to 
produce the "special relationship" with Israel, it is an issue 
with which the U.S. has dealt ineffectively. As a result of 
these facts, the Arab-Israeli conflict, if left uncontained and 
unresolved, presents a threat to the U.S. national interest in 
two ways. First, the lack of a peaceful resolution of the 
Palestinian problem will contribute greatly to a perpetual
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state of regional instability. This regional instability 
will leave the U.S. national interest (secure Western access 
to a steady supply of Middle Eastern oil) in jeopardy, while 
threatening a "special1 concern that the U.S. has for the 
survival of Israel. Second, the continuance of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict will continue to undermine U.S. influence in 
the region, and the U.S. ability to act successfully in 
defense of its national interest, should it come under 
attack. Given a pro-Israel U.S. policy in the Middle East, 
and the continuing inability of the U.S. to convince Israel 
that it should actively seek peace, it seems likely that anti- 
U.S. violence, the Soviet presence in the region, and the 
attractiveness of the Islamic fundamentalist doctrine will 
continue to increase.
This analysis is presented not to suggest that the United 
States can or should abandon ties with Israel. Rather, it 
calls for the striking of a happier medium between a concern 
for the health of the "special relationship" with Israel, and 
the national interest of the United States in the region. A 
suggestion as to how this can be more effectively 
accomplished is taken up in the final section. For the 
meantime, we turn our attention to the Soviet threat, and the 
manner by which superpower competition in the Middle East 
can, and does, threaten the U.S. national interest.
The Soviet Threat
When the Soviet Union embarked on a military invasion 
into neighboring Afghanistan in December of 1979, then 
President Jimmy Carter commented that the Soviet Union was, 
"*«.now attempting to consolidate a strategic position... 
that poses a grave threat to the movement of Middle East 
oil."* Despite President Carter's own self proclaimed 
ignorance about the "true" nature of Soviet foreign policy 
prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the potential threat of 
Soviet adventurism in the Middle East has, in fact, been of 
concern to U.S. foreign policy makers since the early 
1950's. This concern has become increasingly intense over 
time, not only because of the increased importance of the 
region's primary resource, but also because of an increase in 
the Soviet Union's power projection capabilities, and in 
their apparent willingness to use them, if conditions are 
favorable.
Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East has 
traditionally been directed by the more general tenets of 
Soviet foreign policy as a whole, at any particular point in 
time. Immediately following the conclusion of WWII, the 
Soviet Union was largely uninvolved in events in the Middle 
Past, due to a strong and determined U.S. opposition which 
they encountered when they attempted to become involved. For
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example, following the war, the Soviets refused to leave
northern Iran, which had been occupied by Soviet and British
troops during the war to secure a path for supplies headed to
the Soviet Union. The Soviets denied the Iranian government
access to the area, and, in the meantime, worked to
strengthen the power of the local Communist party. This
attempt at becoming active in the bordering territories of
the Middle East reflected two general policies of the Soviet
Union, emphasized in the Stalin period. First, a historical
desire to bring territories bordering the Soviet Union under
their control to improve Soviet territorial security. And,
second, the stated role of the USSR as a world revolutionary
2power, and as the leader of the Communist movement.
The policy, however, was not founded on a military
capable of extonding power far beyond Soviet borders. As a
result, because of pressure from the United States and Iran's
central government, the Soviets, after negotiating for the
establishment of a joint-stock, Soviet-Iranian oil company,
and for a certain degree of automony for the northern Iranian
3
territory, peacefully withdrew. The negotiated terms of the 
withdrawal were never enacted by Iran, however, and the 
Soviets remained peripheral to events in the region, for a 
time.
In the 1950's, Soviet policy took a turn following the 
death of Stalin and the rise to power of Nikita Kruschev.
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Kruschev, who was viewed as an active diplomat, became 
personally involved with Soviet attempts at gaining new 
friends and allies. Furthermore, the qualifications for 
beginning a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union were 
loosened through a redefinition of Leninism. This 
redefinition put emphasis on the need for Soviet support of 
anti-Western nationalist movements, which were to aid 
socialism in its fight against the capitalist forces, in 
addition to continued support for the world's Communist 
forces.*
These changes in Soviet foreign policy fit well with ths
changes that had occurred in the Third World, and more
particularly the Middle East, during the period of
decolonization. And, as pointed out by Adeed Dawisha,
Though having interests in the area which were no less 
"imperialistic" than those of the U.S., Britain or 
France, the Soviet Union was perceived at the popular 
level as a friendly and supportive power, simply because 
it was backing the indigenous "nationalist" forces.
This positive view of the Soviet Union at the popular level,
combined with the anti-Western attitude of the nationalist
movements, which had developed out of the West's historical
involvement in the region, greatly aided the rapid growth of
Soviet influence in the Middle East beginning in the 1950's.
While it was the regional changes, and the region's
negative view of the West which provided the open door for
the Soviets, it was their own desire to compete for status in
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a region with close proximity, high value, and a lack of U.S. 
dominance, which made the growth of Soviet influence a 
reality. The primary method used for gaining such influence 
and credibility in the Middle East during this period was 
arms sales. The first Soviet "successes" using arms sales as 
the bait were Syria, and, more importantly, Egypt. In the 
case of Egypt, the Soviets exploited Egyptian opposition to 
the Western sponsored Baghdad pact, which later took the name 
CENTO. The pact, between Great Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, 
Iran, and Iraq, was formed to counter increased Soviet 
involvement in the region. However, it actually provided an 
opening to Egypt for the Soviets, who provided an alternative 
source of weapons, particularly following the Israeli-Brit.ish 
French invasion of Egypt in 1956.**
The sale of modern weaponry to the Arab world greatly 
improved the image of the Soviet Union during the 1950's, 
while it also increased the military power and the stature of 
her clients in the Middle East. By the early 1960's, the 
Soviet Union's influence had become established in three of 
the region's most important states: Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.
Furthermore, Soviet influence had begun to take hold in Yemen 
and Algeria, and the overwhelming wave of Arab nationalism 
was causing turbulence in two Arab states which could be
7loosely termed "Western assets": Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
The Soviet position grew even stronger in the late
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1960's, especially in Egypt, following that nation's poor 
showing in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967* After the war, the 
Soviets provided a much needed resupply of weapons, and 
economic support, upon which Egypt soon became dependent. In 
return for such aid, the Soviets were granted the use of 
naval and air facilities, which marked a high point for the
g
Soviet Union's presence in the region. Subsequently, just 
as quickly as Soviet influence had risen, it went into a 
rapid and sudden decline.
The 1970's was a decade in which both superpowers would
learn a very poignant lesson; namely, that arms sales and
economic interaction do not buy permanent alliances, nor
control over the policies of the nations of the Middle East.
For the Soviets, the change in the leadership of Egypt
following Nasser's death in 1970 brought with it a change in
the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Although a Soviet-Egyptian
treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in May of
1971, Sadat soon took action to alter the relationship after
his requests for increased arms sales and economic
commitments went largely unfulfilled. In July of 1972, Sadat
announced that Soviet military personnel, numbering between
15 and 20 thousand, were being expelled, and that, of the
extensive Soviet military presence, only their use of naval
gfacilities would remain largely as it was before. Even when 
the Soviets risked their newly formed detente relationship
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with Washington in order to back Syria and Egypt in the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, Sadat continued to criticize the Soviets, 
and searched for a way to open up relations with the United 
States. Finally, in March of 1976, Egypt unilaterally 
terminated the treaty signed just 5 years earlier, and 
announced the end of Soviet access to their naval 
facilities.10
The Soviet position in the Middle East was deteriorated 
evem further by events in "pro-Soviet" Iraq. During 1978 and 
1979, a total of forty-eight members of the Iraqi Communist 
Party were executed for attempting to establish a communist 
organization within the armed forces.11 Although economic 
ties remain extensive, Iraq has continued to look to the West 
for its technology and equipment. Furthermore, as in Egypt, 
it is clear that this continuing economic interaction, and 
the 1972 treaty of friendship and cooperation between Iraq 
and the Soviet Union, have not given the Soviets the 
political influence which they had sought. And, given the 
Soviet’s uncommited stance regarding the Iran-Iraq War, this 
relationship will most likely continue to wane.
Currently, some 30 years after the inception of serious 
Soviet activity in the region, the Soviet Union's position in 
the Middle East has improved somewhat. Clearly, however, the 
Soviet Union's ability to retain the gains which remain, or 
to build a larger presence in the future, is dependent on
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factors outside of its control. These factors are very 
similar to those with which the United States must deal, 
including Islamic fundamentalism, an anti-superpower attitude 
in the region, regional cleavages among Arab states such as 
Iran and Iraq, and the burden of the history of Soviet 
failures.
The stymieing nature of these factors is visible even 
within the remaining Soviet “client states1', which by 1980 
amounted to a grand total of three nations: Syria, the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and 
Libya. Libya and Syria are both vehemently Islamic nations, 
which hardly puts them on the same ideological plane with the 
Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet relationship with 
these two countries is precarious at best, having been 
founded on the current need that these countries have for 
Soviet military hardware, which can be used to bolster the 
power of their leaders in the region and their ability to 
maintain domestic control. The only Arab state, which is 
more than "a transient and unreliable ally" of the Soviet 
Union in the Middle Bast is the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen, a nation which just happens to be the poorest of
12them all.
Given that Soviet influence in the region has declined in 
recent years after a period of growth immediately following 
World War II, one may ask whether it is possible for the
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Soviet Union to threaten the U.S. national interest. And, if 
it is possible, whether the Soviet Union has any reason to 
challenge the United States position in the Middle East. 
Although it may appear to be otherwise at first glance, the 
answer to each of these questions is a resounding yes. While 
the Soviets do not have the military might and influence 
needed to take control of the Middle East, they do have 
sufficient power to undermine any effort by the U.S. to 
create an environment favorable to itself and the security of 
the U.S. national interest. Also, the Soviet Union 
understands the strategic value of the Middle East, as does 
the United States. This draws both of them toward a policy 
of competition and active participation in regional 
developments.
Clearly, the Soviet Union has achieved superpower status 
in the late 20th Century, giving it the capability to 
endanger the U.S. national interest in a variety of ways.
The first method which the Soviets could employ is that of a 
direct attack on the Gulf. Such an attack could be a full- 
fledged military invasion, or a very limited attack on the 
concentrated oil fields of the Gulf. Whatever the scenario 
or series of events, which could be envisioned to include 
such a disastrous end, two things are clear. First, in any 
superpower conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has 
the advantage of proximity, despite the fact that "it is an
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advantage which diminishes quite rapidly with distance from
13the Soviet Union." Secondly, the potential damage which 
the Soviet Union could inflict directly on the nations of the 
Middle East, and indirectly on the Western economy, with such 
an attack is immense. Despite these realities, it seems 
highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would tisk the staging 
of a direct attack on the Gulf areas. Although an attack on 
a bordering country such as that staged against Afghanistan 
in 1979 is slightly less unlikely, it would still require a 
set of unusual circumstances which create a unique 
opportunity for the Soviets.
A second method which the Soviet Union could use to 
undermine the U.S. position and Its national interest in the 
region is that of an indirect attack, through the 
manipulation or support of the actions of regional 
clients. 4 Feasibly, this could involve an attack by the 
Soviet supported forces of the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen on neighboring North Yemen, Oman, or Saudi Arabia. 
Or, it could involve the delivery of military and economic 
aid to the Arab participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
allowing Syria and the PLO to continue their struggle against 
Israel and the U.S. with dangerously destabilizing fervor. 
This method, unlike the preceding one, is likely to be 
utilized by the Soviet Union - very probably with a good deal 
of success. As discussed earlier, only a resolution of the
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Arab-Israeli conflict will diminish the effectiveness of this 
method, and slam the door on the Soviet's desire to gain 
wider access to the strategic Persian Gulf.
A third, and final method that could be utilized by the
Soviet Union is the instigation or encouragement of internal
revolt in the weaker nations of the Middle East. This may be
accomplished through a process of befriending indigenous
communist parties, p.ro-Soviet leftists, or anti-Western
nationalists, and preparing them for leadership should an
15opportunity arise. This method is unlikely to be 
successful in the large number of nations in the Middle East, 
where Islamic fundamentalism is becoming a dominant force.
In these nations, the pro-Soviet communist parties are 
ruthlessly suppressed, and new secular leaders are unwelcome.
Thus, it appears that the Soviets have at least one 
potentially effective method currently at their disposal.
The other two methods may become feasible should a change 
occur in certain factors beyond their control, including U.S. 
foreign policy. Whether or not the Soviets utilize the 
method of indirect attack does depend on them, however, and 
their perception of what there is to be gained by actively 
participating in the region's events, or to lose by not 
participating at all.
There are several factors which draw the Soviets toward 
active participation. The first of which is a desire to
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achieve and maintain their superpower status relative to the 
U.S., through competition for influence. Secondly, the 
Soviets are drawn into participation because, "by simple
reason of its geographical proximity, the Middle East has
16long been a region vital to Soviet security." And thirdly,
as Soviet oil production declines in the next two decades,
and as they continue to look to sell more oil to the West in
return for hard currency, the Soviet bloc will require
supplementary oil from the Middle East to satisfy the energy
17requirements of Eastern Europe. All of these forces 
suggest that the Soviet Union will continue to try to fully 
exercise the capabilities at its disposal. The Soviets will 
do so not necessarily with the expectation of achieving rapid 
growth in their influence, which seems unrealistic given 
recent Soviet experiences, but rather with the intention of 
limiting American influence by undermining the region's 
stability.
Thus, the potential threat to the U.S. national interest 
posed by the Soviet Union is very real. The Soviets have 
built their power projection capabilities, particularly their 
naval forces, up to a level from which they can challenge the 
U.S. position in the Middle East. They are aided in their 
challenge by the fact that they have very little left to 
lose, and a lot to gain from making their presence felt. 
Furthermore, the ever changing course of events in the Middle
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Bast gives the non-status quo Soviet Union a second advantage 
relative to the U.S.; since the U.S. has as a main objective, 
the maintenance of stability.
Whether or not the potential of the Soviet threat will be 
realized depends largely on how carefully American foreign 
policy is directed toward containing it. It seems that, up 
to this point, U.S. favoritism for Israel in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict has aided the Soviets, and has increased the 
likelihood of a potentially disastrous direct superpower 
conflict. The manner in which the Soviet threat can be more 
effectively contained, as well as the manner in which the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and Islamic fundamentalism can be ended 
or coped with, is taken up in the final section of this 
treatise.
Reforming American Foreign Policy
As the United States emerged from the Vietnam War in the 
1970's, there was a realization that one of the most 
fundamental threats to the U.S. national interest around the 
world is a U.S. foreign policy based on faulty assumptions, 
improper weighting of regional concerns relative to one 
another, and a lack of understanding with regard to the 
nature or root causes of events there. In order to tie the 
preceding analysis together, this section will examine the 
various instruments or methods that the U.S. can utilize to 
eliminate, or reduce, the dangers associated with the spoke 
concerns: Islamic fundamentalism, the continuing Arab-
Israeli conflict, and superpower competition which results 
from a growth in the Soviet presence in the Middle Bast.
One of the root causes of the United States' failure to 
eliminate, or reduce, these dangers has been the Inability of 
U.S. foreign policy makers to effectively distinguish between 
the various concerns that they have in the Middle East. As 
argued previously, this must be done in such a way that the 
most fundamental concerns are protected, and rarely, if ever, 
jeopardized for the sake of less fundamental concerns. Such 
a failure to distinguish between concerns is apparent when 
one considers the United States' unquestioning support for 
Israel.
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There are those who argue that America's highest 
national interest is preservation of what gives it its own 
sense of self-worth —  religious liberty, democratic
2institutions, moral character, and western culture." Since 
these values are embodied in Israel, rather than the Arab 
world, they argue that America's "highest national interest" 
in the Middle East is the protection and furthering of the 
state of Israel. Others argue that America's "highest 
national interest" lies in Israel because, "peace, stability 
and security in the Middle East can be preserved by a strong
3Israel receiving U.S. arms and economic assistance."
Both of these arguments lack a critical foundation in 
reality, however. First, favoritism for Israel has made the 
Arab world much more susceptible to .Soviet influence. 
Secondly, it has contributed to the strengthening of the 
Islamic fundamentalists, and to an increase in the likelihood 
that American lives and interests will be endangered. 
Furthermore, although, on the hierarchy of interests spoken 
of earlier, it may be that the U.S. has a "high" concern 
about preserving i t s own feeling of self-worth, it is obvious 
that this concern cen never be satisfied unless the 
foundation, upon which U.S. power rests, is strong. Thus, if 
the West has a lower than adequate supply of oil, its 
economy, and in turn the national strength and the 
fulfillment of the "higher" goals of the United States, will
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suffer*
Although it is true that the United States and Israel do 
have many things in common, and that the "special 
relationship" is often mutually beneficial, this should not 
be taken as proof that Israel's national interests are 
entirely compatible with the U.S. national interest in the 
region. Clearly, such complete compatibility does not 
exist. For example, despite a U.S. desire to peacefully 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel has continued to 
exacerbate it by continuing support for Jewish settlements in 
the occupied West Bank, and by formally annexing the Golan 
Heights in 1981 in violation of the spirit of Security 
Council Resolution 242. Among other things, the resolution 
calls for the withdrawal of Israel from these territories, 
occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Similarly, despite 
a U.S. concern about the maintenance of stability and peace 
in the Middle East, Israel launched an air strike on an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor in 1981, a "pre-emptive" invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982, and an air raid on the PLO's headquarters in the 
capital of Tunisia in 1985. This last raid was aided by 
information in thousands of classified U.S. documents 
obtained by Israel through the spying of Jonathan Jay 
Pollard, a former U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, on their
4behalf. Finally, whereas the U.S. must be concerned about 
achieving a military balance in the region which deters risk
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taking and encourages a peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Israel has shown that it "will do whatever
5its leaders regard as necessary for security."
In spite of these Israeli actions which have put the U.S.
national interest in jeopardy repeatedly, U.S. criticism of
Israel has been extraordinarily mild; and massive U.S. aid
totalling more than $3.6 billion in 1986, continues to flow
freely. As suggested by William Quandt, a former member of
the National Security Council during the Carter
Administration, "the Israeli tail sometimes wags the American
dog in the tight relationship."** The dangers associated with
allowing Israel to make decisions for the United States are
immense, however. As Hans Morgenthau warns
Strong nations...lose their freedom of action by 
identifying their own national interests with those of a 
weak ally. Secure in the support of its powerful friend, 
the weak ally can choose the objectives and methods of 
its foreign policy to suit itself. The powerful nation 
then finds it must support interests...that are not vital 
:o itself, but only to its ally.
As stated earlier, this critique is not intended to 
suggest that the United States should end its "special 
relationship" with Israel. Rather, what is called for is a 
"normal relationship" which takes into account domestic 
political realities, as a constraint instead of a determinant 
of policy, and balances them with international political and 
economic necessities. It should be a relationship which can 
endure corrective criticism, similar to that which is
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routinely traded between the U.S., Western Europe and Japan, 
which has been rare in coming from the United States under 
the "special relationship". This criticism should in no way 
demand compliance to the wishes of the party giving it, nor 
should i t be accompanied by pointless threats. However, it 
should be given, as warranted, in a way such that the U.S. 
stance in the Middle East, at the least, takes on an aura of 
being less one-sided. Such a return to a more balanced 
policy in the Middle East may ultimately restore U.S. 
credibility as a mediator of the persistent Arab-Israeli 
conflict, making a resolution of it much wore likely than it 
is at present.
The establishment of such a "normal relationship" with 
Israel, and the creation of an American foreign policy that 
is truly capable of protecting the U.S. national interest, 
requires a definite understanding of why the U.S. is 
committed to the survival of Israel. Clearly, the basis is a 
shared cultural affinity and shared values, "rooted in strong 
emotions, Biblical and historical, galvanized by feelings of
Dguilt and obligation arising from the Holocaust."
The commitment is not, on the other hand, the result of 
an Israeli capability to successfully act as a protectorate 
of the entire region, against Soviet infiltration or attack, 
Islamic fundamentalism, or Arab radicals, a capability which 
simply does not exist. Nor is it because the two countries
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share a total commonality of national interests in the 
region. It is open to doubt, for example, that Israel would 
willingly respond to an attack by Iran or South Yemen on 
Saudi Arabian oil fields, even if such a response was 
requested by the U.S. or the other members of the Western 
alliance.
With the true basis of the U.S. commitment to the 
survival of Israel in mind, U.S. foreign policy can again be 
more correctly directed toward defining its own national 
interest, and toward defending it with the instruments that 
are actually at the United States disposal. Primarily, the 
U.S. must concentrate on defusing the Palestinian problem 
with peaceful means, based on the realization that it is a 
rallying point for radical forces, and is constantly 
exploited by the Soviet Union for its own purposes. While 
the specifics of a solution to this long-lasting conflict are 
well beyond the scope of this discussion, it is clear that in 
order for a successful compromise settlement to be reached, 
the United States must remain committed to seeking peace, and 
to earning the trust of the Arab world as a potential 
mediator of the conflict.
Whether or not a solution to the Arab-Isi^eli conflict is 
eventually achieved, it seems likely that the U.S. will 
continue to be challenged by the Soviet Union in the Middle 
East; although such a solution would significantly reduce the
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possibility of a direct superpower conflict. On numerous 
occasions during the early 1980's, Soviet authorities 
expressed a desire to gain "more even handed access to Middle 
East oil supplies...enabling them to reduce production 
investment, postpone reform, spend more on defense - a number 
of options the West might prefer to deny them."^ Presumably, 
if the Soviets are able to obtain access to Middle Eastern 
oil, they will also keep the depletion rate of their own 
resources steady, while hastening the rate at which the 
energy pool of the industrialized West is depleted.
Under current market conditions, the Soviets have an even 
better reason to go in search of greater access to the 
region's oil. With the price of oil at a low level, relative 
to the early 1980's, the Soviets must sell a greater quantity 
of oil on the market to earn the same amount of hard 
currency. This point becomes particularly clear when one 
considers the proportion of hard currency earnings normally 
generated by the sale of petroleum, totalling over 56 percent 
in 1979.*° In order to fill the gap created by a stable 
level of oil consumption and a decrease in the quantity of 
oil available for domestic consumption, as a result of an 
increase in the quantity of Soviet oil sold on the world 
market, either an outside source of energy must be tapped, or 
mere Soviet oil must be produced (or as a last resort 
consumption must be decreased). Ironically however, in order
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for the Soviets to produce more oil, they need technology 
from the West which is only available to purchasers with hard 
currency. Clearly, something’s got to give.
Recalling the dangers associated with having the Soviet 
Union merely competing for influence in the Middle East, it 
seems obvious that the U.S. has good reason to be extremely 
concerned about the potential dangers associated with having 
the Soviet Union competing for access to oil. Before 
extensive superpower competition develops over the region's 
primary resource, it may be that the best policy for the West 
to pursue is one which raises "the costs of Soviet operations 
in the area while simultaneously...helping the USSR to lower 
the costs of developing its own energy sources."1,1 This, of 
course, is easier said than done.
President Carter's declaration in 1980, that any hostile 
effort undertaken with the purpose of controlling the Gulf 
would be repelled with any means necessary, including 
military force, has been carried over into the Reagan 
administration's policies; however, the stated policy has not 
solved the long-standing problem of how to bring U.S. power 
to bear in the region. One requirement for a successful 
military action in the Middle East, in defense of the U.S. 
national interest, is that of assistance from friendly 
states. The importance of this requirement is clear when one 
considers the supply lines of U.S. troops in the Middle East,
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which stretch half way around the world, in comparison to the 
relatively short, land-based supply lines of the Soviet 
Union. The assistance from friendly states can include 
secure rights to the use of national facilities, the support 
of indigenous military forces, and the coordination of 
contingency planning and military training exercises. 
Unfortunately, as of 1985, almost all of the states 
cooperating in at least one of these ways (Kenya, Somalia,
Turkey, Oman, and Egypt), with the exception of Oman, were
12distant from the region's primary oil fields. Thus, it 
appears that, given the relative weakness or the oil-rich 
Gulf states, and the lack of pre-established U.S. military 
bases in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. would pr.bably have to go 
it alone in the event of a direct Soviet attack.
Considering the uncertainty which surrounds the 
effectiveness of U.S. military forces in the Middle Eastern 
theatre of war, it seems that a goal of U.S. foreign policy 
is to create an environment in the region that does not 
require the introduction of U.S. forces for active combat 
against the Soviets. One way of doing this is through the 
creation of an aura of American military power in the Middle 
East. Although the U.S. may actually be incapable of taking 
on the Soviets in a protracted Middle Eastern conflict, the 
appearance of tangible military strength, such as a highly 
visible naval force and visible investment in the special
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forces, may be enough to deter direct superpower
13confrontation. Also, the United States retains the last 
resort force of nuclear weapons, which can also act as a 
deterrent to Soviet aggression wherever U.S. interests are 
explicit.
Dealing with indigenous radical Arabs, who may or may not 
receive support from the Soviet Union, and Islamic 
fundamentalist leaders, is a much greater challenge for the 
United States. The likelihood of destabilizing events 
transpiring as a result of these individuals or groups is 
much higher. Also U.S. military force is not applicable to 
the prevention of terrorist truck bombings, or assassination 
attempts waged against moderate Arab leaders in the region. 
The U.S. must largely rely on the capabilities of each 
government with which it has friendly relations, to 
successfully contain dissent through a "smart" domestic 
policy, rather than brut force. Fortunately, it appears that 
the most important Arab state to the U.S., Saudi Arabia, has 
a ruling family that is more prudent than was the Shah of 
Iran.
Clearly the moderate leaders of the Middle East must be 
discouraged from acting as though their nation's existed in a 
vacuum, free from the effects of Islamic fundamentalism and 
entirely distinct from the other Arab nations. As the former 
leaders of Iran and Egypt discovered, a lack of concern about
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public sentiment can be extremely dangerous* In order to
protect the surviving moderate leaders, or to aid them in
protecting themselves and their nations, the U.S. must
continue to heighten its own awareness of the domestic and
political constraints under which the leaders of the Middle
East must operate* And then, the U.S* should conduct its own
policy accordingly, realizing that "attacks are not aimed at
14a specific people, but at a policy in general*"
Such realizations by U.S* foreign policy makers should 
finally cause a change in the U*S. relationship with the 
nations of the Middle East* The U*S* would be wise to play 
down, publicly, the relationship that it has with vital 
nations in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, until it can 
improve its standing in the Middle East. To improve its 
standing in the Arab world, the U.S* must intensify its 
effort to solve the underlying Arab-Israeli conflict, which 
has plagued the U.S. position in the region, and has 
exacerbated the threats presented by the Soviet presence and 
Islamic fundamentalism. In order to do this, the U.S* must 
take a more balanced stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
while remaining committed to the survival of Israel. And 
finally, the U.S. must begin redefining the often faulty 
assumptions upon which its foreign policy has been based 
during the last 20 years.
As we have seen, the United States national interest in
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the Middle East is Western access to a secure and steady 
supply of oil, which is the lifeline of the Western economy, 
its industries, and its military apparatus. While the United 
States has other concerns in the region, none is as primary 
as the concern over Middle Eastern oil. Despite wishful 
thinking regarding U.S. oil import dependency, it appears 
that it is once again on the rise. Furthermore, Western 
reliance on the region's oil is likely to increase even more 
drastically as the West's oil wells begin to run dry. As 
this occurs, the U.S. national interest in the Middle East 
will become even more paramount. Only through a peaceful 
resolution of the Palestinian problem, and a subsequent 
effort to contain Soviet influence and Islamic 
fundamentalism, can Western dependence be made bearable.
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